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There is a story about the situation of art and music in society that runs 
something like this: 
Once upon a time, music was connected with ritual and religion. 
As described by Rene Girard, art embodies both the essential vio-
lence of mimetic rivalry and its resolution (or deferral) in societal 
order through the designation of a scapegoat. In Girard's hypotheti-
cal originary scene, a crowd of proto-humans surrounds an object 
desired by each of them. The potential violence of this periphery is 
defused, this time, by what constitutes the beginnings of human cul-
ture: the selection of an "emissary victim" on whom the violence of 
the whole group is concentrated serves to establish a community and 
defer conflict.] As Eric Gans describes the scene, "The group of 
murderers surrounding the body experience[s] a sudden release of 
tension, their violence spent, and they contemplate the body as the 
source of this miraculous transformation of violence in to peace. The 
body of the victim thus becomes for Girard the object of 'the first 
noninstinctive attention,' which turns it into a sacred object, the first 
signifier and the source of all signification."2 Jacques Attali has adop-
ted and elaborated the Girardian model for music, asserting that 
noise, the raw material of music, is violence, and that music is both 
"threat of death" and "pure order."3 In a variant of Girard's thesis 
that Gans constructed and applied to music, the violence of the 
originary scene is deferred by an act of communal designation or 
reference (the emphasis is on representation rather than the mur-
der of the emissary victim), delaying violence and the appetitive and 
allowing a moment of contemplation that constitutes the central 
] Rene Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977). 
This description is glossed from John Rahn, "What Is Valuable in Art, and Can Music Still 
Achieve It?," Perspectives of New Music 27, no. 2 (1989): 6-17. 
2 Eric Gans, "Art and Entertainment," Perspectives of New Music 24, no. 1 (1985): 24-37. 
Quote from p. 31. 
3 Jacques Attali, Noise: The Political Economy of Music, trans. John Cumming (New York: 
Seabury, 1972): 30-31. 
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object as sacred, partly by virtue of that very deferment of conflict 
and constitution of community. This model is supposed to underlie 
Western culture from its beginnings through the Middle Ages, and 
to persist, perhaps less fundamentally, in later epochs as an impor-
tant mode of explanation for behavior.4 
The story continues: As religion was displaced by Reason during 
the Renaissance and Enlightenment, music and art in general gradu-
ally assumed the burden of the Sacred in secular culture. This pro-
cess flowered at the end of the eighteenth century in a Romanticism 
that poured the Sacred, or sublime, into Nature, reaffirming a secu-
lar kind of mystical or ecstatic experience (and emotion) as against 
or alongside Reason. Art was the essential medium of that ecstasy, 
which was (as always) a very personal thing. Art assumed some of the 
status of religion along with the burden of its transferred experi-
ence. 
This all was not unconnected to historical developments in eco-
nomics and science. The creation of a commercial middle class dur-
ing the Renaissance supported the movement from a centralized re-
ligion to Protestant variations and to a Reason that was available to 
every person and made all things comparable, hence exchangeable, 
pointing to the commodity; and of course, the beginnings of indus-
trialization in the late eighteenth century created a bourgeoisie for 
whom Romanticism, had it not existed, would have to have been 
invented. 
Industrialization progressed through a number of stages. Its most 
important features for art were mass production and the technolo-
gies of replication (photography, sound recording, etc.). Eventually, 
we arrive at the present, "postmodern" culture, where information 
and replication have changed the face of economics and of society. 
Television and computer technology, what the French call "infor-
4 See Eric Gans, The End of Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); idem, 
"Art and Entertainment," Perspectives of New Music 24, no. 1 (1985): 24-37; idem, "Mallarme, 
Wagner, and the Power of Music," in Proceedings of the Music and Power Symposium, ed. John 
Rahn (Seattle: Center for Creation and Interdisciplinary Study of Music, School of Music, 
University of Washington, 1991),86-110; and idem, "The Beginning and End of Esthetic 
Form," Perspectives of New Music 29, no. 2 (1991): 8-21. It is possible to criticize the model as 
sexist, parochial, and violence-centered, but the model has wide currency in critical circles. It 
is particularly useful here in that it ties up in one package an origin myth for religion, 
human culture, and language, and in that it is a theory of the center and periphery that can 
be used for both religious and political discussion. I believe that my use of this model later in 
this essay to talk about music does not entail those aspects of it that may give rise to such 
objections. 
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matiques," have brought all cultures (including cultures of the past 
and of most areas of the globe) and all technical information into a 
web available to and manipulable by anyone. In fact, TV force-feeds 
much of this information to practically everyone, though the infor-
mation is filtered through the medium in a way that excludes what is 
difficult. TV broadcasts a fine spray of surfaces. Multi-national corpo-
rations preside over a world in which the nation-state is being pulver-
ized and dissolved in the global triumph of capitalism, and the rise 
of ethnic loyalties fails to compensate for the massive production of 
consumers and the fatal attraction of identity in the homogeneous 
world of the simulacrum. MTV celebrates the rites of the ecstasy of 
nondifferentiation, dancing to the whip-beats of consumer culture. 
Depth and individuality have faded away, and high art can no longer 
motivate itself as the vicar of a universal religious impulse that has 
etiolated and finally dispersed, even in its bourgeois avatar. 
Thus endeth the story.5 It leaves us in a position to ask the following 
questions: What can an artist or composer do today? How can a composer 
situate the sources of her art with respect to her societal matrix, and in 
particular, with respect to religion and politics? How can art be possible 
any longer, or, what kind of art is now possible? This essay will explore the 
area of these questions, rather than attempting to answer them. It will first 
biopsy the traditions of religion and politics in Western culture, peering 
through a lens made of two concepts: the center, and dissent. 
* * * 
The Western tradition of the relation of a person to his cultural matrix, 
of a citizen to the city, crystallizes out in Greek civilization, and is nowhere 
better epitomized than in the paradox of Plato and Socrates. I will speak 
It is not a very true story, if only because it oversimplifies so much-for example, 
"religion" is collapsed into some hypothetical proto-society as model for all societies, ignor-
ing the variety of religious practices in the world over time and geography. However, the 
storyteller has at least tried not to embody a number of the current faiths about history. The 
story takes neither the (Marxist) position that economic and material "substrates" determine 
culture, nor the position that cultural innovation sparks development in material relations, 
nor the position that musical developments, while determined to some extent by economic 
ones, nevertheless precede and announce them, nor any position-such as those of Platonism 
or Marxism or Hegelianism or Liberalism or various religions-about the possible causes of 
historical change within whatever stream (if any) is deemed the most relevant or master 
discourse. The story does not even contain any faith in causality as such. 
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as though "Plato" and "Socrates" could be clearly disentangled from the 
Dialogues and attributed each to a separate historical person. In fact, 
although the two personae are indeed use ably distinct, it is not possible to 
know with certainty to what extent they may have coexisted in one or the 
other historical person, Socrates or Plato. 
We know of Socrates through Plato's brilliant and attractive documen-
tation in the Dialogues, yet the two personae are radically distinct when 
viewed politically. Plato, whose views surface in works such as the Republic, 
is an authoritarian, totalitarian centrist who would so like to control all 
things for the good that he advocates a genetically controlled secular hier-
archy-a sort of Brave Old World-and would exile or regulate music and 
art as potentially disruptive. Plato's utopian "aristocracy," the rule of the 
best, is also communist, with community and State control of property, 
procreation, children, and education.6 Control above all. Historical societ-
ies that have approached Plato's degree of centralism, without attaining its 
degree of control, include various kinds of theocracies, such as ancient 
Egypt or pre-Columbian Peru (two water monopolies); the Aztecs and the 
Nazis (warrior cultures based on human sacrifice); and, perhaps the clos-
est approximation, China during the Cultural Revolution. This is the posi-
tion of the Center. 
Yet it was Plato who has seduced generations of readers with art-his 
fluid and lucid prose-into utter admiration for Socrates. Socrates the 
gadfly; Socrates who, if you met him in the street, would ask you uncom-
fortable questions, and would ask you to question what you took for granted; 
Socrates who thought and felt apart from his role in the city-state; Socrates 
the sower of contagious dissent, who was executed after conviction in a 
State trial for blasphemy and corrupting the youth. Socrates who pursued 
the goal of knowing oneself (gnothi s'auton). We may ask: What self? Where 
is its substance? Whatever it may be, it is a self apart from society's roles, a 
non-cog in the machine, though Socrates faithfully performed his duties 
within his society, serving for instance as a foot soldier in the Athenian 
army. It is a non-reactive and non-political kind of apartness. Socrates is so 
far from being a rebel, so devoted to duty, honor, country, that he chooses 
to die in obedience to the State rather than to go into exile. Socrates 
insists on self-definition, in an almost existentialist way. He is always looking 
in, looking for an "in," what the East Germans called "Innerlichkeit." Even 
6 Plato's ranking of types of societies is: aristocracy or regency (merit), oligarchy, timocracy 
(wealth), democracy, tyranny. On the community of wives and children and education, see 
Republic V, 457 and VIII, 543; genetic regulation, III, 415; V, 459; VIII, 546--47. Interestingly, 
Plato's "government of the best" goes much against the grain of his own society in admitting 
women to power (V, 451, 455, 456). 
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if there is nothing in, the project of looking for an in or looking inwards-
for-oneself-not to society-is definitive. 
Although the life of Socrates was a basically secular project, there were 
religious elements: Socrates's "daemon" appeared to him from time to 
time, immobilizing him during its occupation and by its appearances en-
couraging his sense of self. But personal daemons were not common 
among the Greeks, and his was a curiosity to his circle.7 Socrates con-
structed an idea and experience of the contemplative that had no parallel 
in Greek religions: the Delphic oracle is an anomaly-the Pythoness was 
the mystic for all (so that no one else need be mystical)-and the Eleusinian 
Mysteries were non-contemplative, organized ritual more akin to Masonic 
llites than to, say,Jain or Christian mystical contemplation or to the tradi-
tion of "humanist" personal contemplation that sprang from Socrates and 
endures to this day. 
From a centrist perspective, Socrates represents dissent, a "feeling apart 
from" that separates him from his matrix, even a flight from the center, a 
bad seed. But for Socrates, it is not the center or matrix that determines (as 
a mold determines what is molded) a dissent-as-reaction, dissent-as-nega-
tive. He is not a negative of society. He has made society'S norms irrelevant 
in principle to his thoughts, while remaining fully engaged with that soci-
ety. Socrates as apolitical non-religious dissent; Plato as political "reaction-
ary," Plato-the-center as the negative of dissent, Plato as that which is 
molded by dissent-control. This is the foundational Moment-Hegelian 
tension-for Western philosophy and "humanism." 
* * * 
If Socrates and Plato, dissent and reactive centrism, are two sides of one 
half of the coin, the symbolon, the Judeo-Christian tradition provides the 
other half of the symbol of Western culture. Of course there is a broad 
parallel between the lives of Jesus and Socrates: Jesus was one with God 
but, like Socrates, "apart from" society without reacting to it as its negative, 
and executed for his apartness. (This is the home of the Girardian model.) 
In the case of Job, we have a complex situation involving God's negative 
reaction to Job's faith-almost as if God, tempted by Satan, were dissent-
ing from His own worship. The locus is no longer society but faith in God, 
no longer political but religious, and God's perverse dissent is a negative 
of Himself. 
7 Socrates's daemon may have been petit mal epilepsy, like Julius Caesar's, the affliction 
of many another eminent personage. If so, the petit mal seems to have been an intense part of 
their lives, and one which may have been helpful or formative for these people. Any medical 
description cannot trivialize the experience. 
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But it is the Fall that is definitive here, rather than the Girardian Jesus 
or the Case of Job. John Milton, that genius of a culture so occupied by 
Original Sin, asks the Heavenly Muse to sing 
Of Man's First Disobedience, and the Fruit 
Of that Forbidden Tree, whose mortal taste 
Brought Death into the world, and all our woe. [Paradise Lost I, 1-3] 
God, who 
from the first 
Wast present, and with mighty wings outspread 
Dove-like satst brooding on the vast Abyss 
And madest it pregnant. [1,19-22] 
This God describes himself as he orders his Son (ho logos) to create the 
world with a word. He says to His Son: 
bid the Deep 
Within appointed bounds be Heav'n and Earth, 
Boundless the Deep, because I am who fill 
Infinitude, nor vacuous the space. 
Though I uncircumscrib'd myself retire, 
And put not forth my goodness, which is free 
To act or not, Necessity and Chance 
Approach not mee, and what I will is Fate. [VII, 166-73] 
A pervasive Center with a singularity in it allowing dissent. The Apple is 
the power of dissent-as invoked by the Serpent: 
o Sacred, Wise, and Wisdom-giving plant, 
Mother of Science, Now I feel thy Power 
Within me clear, not only to discern 
Things in their Causes, but to trace the ways 
Of highest Agents, deem'd however wise. [IX, 679-83] 
Without this dissent, there would be no human story, no history. Whereas 
the dissent of Socrates was the mold filled by Plato's Center, here the om-
nipotent, omnipresent God is the mold, Sin and the Fall its negative, 
dissent molded by the Center: a double obverse. In each case, dissent 
takes the form of self-knowledge, gnothi s'auton, knowledge of Good and 
Evil: autonomy. 
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In later Christianity there arises another kind of dissent: faith as self-
knowledge. Faith, oneness with God, is dissent, from society and from the 
Church. The implicit model is Jesus. St. Francis of Assisi, for example, was 
a troublemaker, a problem for the Church, who could stand over against 
the Church within the Church because of the inner authority of his faith. 
Change within the Christian religion has been catalyzed by this kind of 
dissent-through-faith, this affirmation of autonomy with respect to society 
and institutions such as the Church, through the individual relation to 
God. So the question is not Church versus State. These are merely two 
societal institutions squaring off or relating or even merging. The ques-
tion is one of the possibility of individual autonomy, giving law to oneself 
(or taking law directly from God to oneself). The dissenter is "apart from" 
culture and society and the secular or religious institutions. The opposite 
of dissent is compliance. 
Art is dissent. Issues of elitism, "high" or cultivated versus "low" or 
popular art, mechanisms of patronage and support (by Church or aristoc-
racy or bourgeoisie or State)-all these are basically red herrings. Art is 
dissent, autonomy, feeling apart from, taking responsibility for one's own 
foundations, then putting forth that autonomy in an object designed to 
engage others. Entertainment and folk art are often mere compliance, 
working within given norms and rules, crafting objects that reaffirm their 
place and the place of the crafter in an unquestioned regime. The enter-
tainer is not an agent. Autonomy is an Archimedean place to stand, from 
which an act is possible. 
* * * 
We have seen that dissent is not necessarily rebellion or violence: Socrates 
the good citizen, Francis the good Catholic. What is music's relation to 
violence? Sound is inherently invasive-one cannot turn one's ears away 
from a sound-but sound is not necessarily violent in itself. Think of 
soothing noises. The violence music may have, or be, is composed into it. 
Violent music, the beat, is especially apt for that originary scene. The beat 
exemplifies the dangerous focus of the periphery on the center and its 
resolution either in violence or in an act of reference. Music, dance, and 
ritual all function to celebrate as well as to exemplifY that deferral of 
actual violence through the constitution of a community. Music that has 
pronounced beats facilitates the coordination of the movements of the 
crowd in the dance, stamping and jerking, bobbing and weaving together 
to the beat in kinetic camaraderie. Here is an indifference preserved from 
mimetic rivalry by the reference of the beat to reference, and to the 
emissary victim; preserved by the reference of the beat to the moment of 
sacrifice. Blissful identity in community. 
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So one of the most violent things a mUSICIan can do is to compose 
music without a beat. With a reduced presence of the beat, music can be 
construed as reverting to a reference to the moment of the originary 
scene prior to the constitution of religion, language, and community, or to 
its analog in society; the periphery thus unstructured is prey to violence 
among its members. From Webern's floating palindromes, to the water-
color washes of Boulez (the maitre sans marteau) , the intricated implica-
tions of Milton Byron Babbitt (a beat like a "bush, with frizzled hair im-
plicit" [Paradise Lost VII, 323]), some pieces by Ligeti, such as the Cello 
Concerto, Volumina, or Atmospheres, some electronic music-these are radi-
cal and revolutionary proposals, in that the music to some extent cuts 
loose from the reassurance of the beat, freeing the crowd from the ritual 
violence that affirms identity in community, and making possible the re-
newal of an individuality in nonhierarchical indifference that may danger-
ously revalidate the original mimetic rivalry. This music at least no longer 
celebrates the deferral of violence. 
The beat is not the whole story. Xenakis's clouds of sounds, especially 
in stochastic pieces such as Metastasis and Pithoprakta, are beat-free and 
decentered, but this music so explicitly embodies crowd violence (which 
Xenakis has traced to his youth during the civil war in Greece) that it 
always refers to peace. The Minimalists, especially Philip Glass, conjure 
away the beat by stroking it to death. Under the surface of a Glass opera, 
under the superficially sweet tonal sounds and iterated patterns, lies anar-
chy barely restrained by a neofascistical rage for order-compare Einstein 
on the Beach, for example, with the monumental, repetitive architecture of 
II Duce's Esposizione Universale di Roma. 8 John Cage shuns syntax as a mili-
tary metaphor, encouraging a gentle, depersonalized anarchy, approach-
ing anarchy not from the neofascist angle but from a Zen minimalism of 
the self that eludes structure from without by opening the self. 
If in medieval chant we have a free-flowing, beatless art music that is 
communal, centrist, and nonviolent (because in that culture the emissary 
victim is consumed daily), in contemporary rock we have a music-mostly 
a trade rather than an art-decked out with all the trappings of violence 
and individuality, which slavishly serves identity and the Center, snarling 
and fawning, aping the gestures of dominance and submission. Black leather 
and the lash of the backbeat. Watch them dancel This music-commodity 
8 I am by no means accusing anybody of fascist political convictions; Glass in particular 
would seem from his libretti to be rather liberal. It is the music in itself that seems to have 
this character, which is part of the fascination it has for me. For a devastating feminist 
critique of power relations in Minimalist visual art, see Anna Chave, "Minimal ism and the 
Rhetoric of Power," The Arts Magazine Uanuary 1990): 44-63. 
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needs to mass-produce its consumers. It is so effective at this, and at 
promoting the ecstasy of identity and submission, that there is always the 
possibility of a backlash. But such impulses of individuality and rebel-
lion-even those of the performers as they are inducted into the system, 
and even MTV's own self-mocking and autopastiche-are siphoned off 
into their simulacra and resold to the consumer, reinforcing the instru-
mentality of the music and its performers, the submission of the con-
sumer, and the dominance of the system that links them. The chant that is 
packaged for today's popular audience is no doubt partly a soothing "new 
age" narcotic, partly a renaissance of appreciation for the musical qualities 
of chant, but would also (at night, so to speak) share with Webern and 
Boulez an individualizing potential for mass violence, no longer, as it was 
in its native culture, defused by the Mass. However, we already see the 
emergence of a totally debased popular-music chant style that deflects indi-
vidualization by Disneyfication. 
* * * 
These permutations need to be rethought from the perspective offemi-
nist theory. Has violence been gendered? Is violence in fact male, in some 
sense that is prior to the constructions of gender? If so, would this suffice 
to condemn violence in all contexts? Can one coherently condemn 
Beethoven's Ninth for violence while maintaining a posture of approval 
toward violent rock such as Heavy Metal?9 Both promote community by 
celebrating violence. But in the case of Beethoven, it is a violence of per-
sonal struggle against adversity, more intimate, more constructive, and 
more meaningful than the violence of rock, which is therefore less threat-
ening than Beethoven. Neither is subversive, except that Beethoven's art is 
dissent, while most rock is compliance. (Not all: think of Jimi Hendrix.) 
Are such notions as hierarchy, the Center, reference and the symbol as 
such, and the Lacanian Symbolic all phallogocentric, as many theorists 
maintain? Is there in music (as I have suggested elsewhere) a way out of 
the semiotics trap, a way to render irrelevant not only the symbol, the 
referent, the sign, and signification, but even the theory behind the sig-
9 Against Beethoven, see for example Susan McClary, Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, 
and Se:x:uality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), particularly the essay "Get-
ting Down Off the Beanstalk," 112-31; for Beethoven and against McClary, see Pieter van 
den Toorn, "Politics, Feminism, and Contemporary Music Theory," The Journal of Musicology 
9, no. 3 (1991): 275-99 (especially pp. 285ff.); and replying to van den Toorn, Ruth A. Solie, 
"What Do Feminists Want? A Reply to Pieter van den Toorn," The Journal of Musicology 9, no. 
4 (1991): 399-411. 
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nifier?10 If this complex is indeed escapable, why should one try to escape? 
If it is escapable, and if it is desirable to escape it, how can such concepts 
as the symbol, or hierarchy, be replaced with feminist or alteritive con-
structions? What would be the criteria guiding such construction-what 
kinds of structuration are either nongendered or nonmale, and what val-
ues might operate during this reconstruction? For example, would domi-
nance give way to anarchy, or to some tribal solid block of interrelated-
ness, embedding its members like flies in amber? Should violence be 
courted and recuperated, or avoided entirely, and what consequences 
would this have for society-without violence, what about order, what 
about change? Is some kind of individualism possible, or desirable? 
Does autonomy imply a "centered subject," or even a "subject"? Does 
dissent incorporate center-swallow it-so that there would be a prolifera-
tion of individual centers, mini-Mussolinis? Just as Plato in the Republic 
approaches the character of people through the character of the State, 
then reflects the qualities of each kind of State back into the character of 
its citizens, so dissent can be recursed into the person. There is a politics 
of the body and psyche. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have advocated 
(in the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia) an anti-oedipal indisci-
pline of schizo analysis, a nonstructure of the rhizome, the individual as 
the swarm, the pack, and the machine. lI They will tell you how to make 
yourself a body without organs-the person as machinic assemblage, 
nonhierarchized objets partiaux or desiring intensities which are unlinked 
by any semiosis, non-totalized.12 Such partial objects exemplify 
the exact criterion of real distinction in Spinoza and Leibniz: they 
do not depend on one another and do not tolerate any relation of 
opposition or contradiction among themselves. The absence of all 
direct links guarantees their common participation in the divine 
substance. Likewise for the partial objects and the body without or-
gans: the body without organs is substance itself, and the partial 
objects, the ultimate attributes or elements of substance. 13 
These notions of substance and the Body Without Organs will recall 
Julia Kristeva's construction of the "chora," a primordial flux or cosmic 
10 John Rahn, "Differences," Perspectives of New Music 31, no. 2 (1993): 58-71. 
11 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (New York: 
Viking Press, 1977), and idem, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Volume 2, 
trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987). 
12 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, chap. 6, "November 28,1947: How Do You 
Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?," 149-66. 
13 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 309, unnumbered footnote. 
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egg of the infant psyche, a turbulence of Freudian "drives" not yet sub-
jected to the order of the symbolic, or even to the regime of the posited 
and therefore of the subject as such, a "place" which fertilizes with its 
creative anarchy the revolution that is poetic language. Kristeva's semiotics 
is of the creative enonciation rather than the packaged enonce, and her chora 
is a possible construction of music.14 
Judith Butler's recent study Gender Trouble repudiates the subject and 
substance by radically historicizing personhood in an austere neo-Fou-
cauldian framework of exoskeletal discourses of power: 
when the subject is said to be constituted, that means simply that the 
subject is a consequence of certain rule-governed discourses that 
govern the intelligible invocation of identity [and of gender]. The 
subject is not determined by the rules through which it is generated 
because signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process 
of repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely 
through the production of substantializing effects. In a sense, all 
signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion to re-
peat; "agency," then, is to be located within the possibility of a varia-
tion on that repetition. IS 
Butler's attempt "to locate the political in the very signifYing practices 
that establish, regulate, and deregulate identity"16 relies on signification, 
which would seem to tie it uncomfortably to some of the discourses she as 
agent is averting, but does point a way to the possibility of subjectless (but 
rather musical) agency as a dynamic balancing act (without an actor, the 
deed without the doer) among a multiplicity of jostling discourses of power, 
a scene that resonates powerfully with the feeling of "postmodernism." 
Dissent and autonomy may have started life in a world of discourse that 
produced Plato's Center as the reaction to them, but the dissent of Socrates, 
like the act that creates art, depends only on the possibility of agency, of 
an act that is not compliance. Dissent is not cast in terms of freedom, 
because determinism is irrelevant to it. If "face" is the surface a person 
presents to the world, and an "interface" is two or more faces in full or 
14 Julia Kristeva, "La semiologie: Science critique et/ou critique de la science," Theorie 
d'ensemble (Paris: Editions du seuil, 1968); idem, La revolution du langage poetique (Paris: Editions 
du seuil, 1974); and idem, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon Roudiez (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1982). 
15 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Sulrversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 
1990),145. 
16 Butler, Gender Trouble, 147. 
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partial contact, then "compliance" is the plastering of one face over the 
surface of the other, more or less completely or tightly adhering to each 
wrinkle and fold of the other facial surface. A superfacial theorist might 
even say that consciousness is hidden away in the facial fold, sheltered in le 
pli that constitutes it: the face is itP So that one face can, with the coop-
eration of another, act as a template for it. The consumer in the face of 
TV: passive compliance as the active revenge of the masses. 18 The extent to 
which a theory adheres only to surfaces, exports the person to the face in 
a characteristically postmodern way, is its degree of superficiality, which 
amounts in the case of postmodernism to superfaciality: for example, But-
ler's notion of agency as eclectic compliance. Even in such an agentless 
world sur faces, agency makes dissent and autonomy possible. The de-
mands of a particular person's discourse may produce a theory of the 
person that is radically multiple, a theory that also constructs personality 
as fugitively multiple, as in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, yet without forfeit-
ing agency and dissent: it imports dissent. The idea of an "in" may be 
problematic, even sexist, and is certainly polar. The idea of a "subject" 
may be repugnant because of its phallogocentrism; or because of its "sub-
stance" (for those who can believe in a subject that has substance); or 
because of its transparent origin in the subject-object grammar of lan-
guages such as Greek, whereas it would be only an interestingly perverse 
idea within Hawaiian (which has no verbs corresponding to "be" or "have,"19 
and so cannot easily hypostasize a subject-place) or within the predicate 
17 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (Paris: Minuit, 1986); and idem, Le pli (Paris: Minuit, 1988). 
See also idem and Felix Guattari, "Faciality," A Thousand Plateaus, 167-9l. 
18 As I have put it elsewhere: "Why is MTV so popular? Jean Baudrillard (Baudrillard 
1988) has suggested that 'the masses,' to which each of us belongs (this is not some term of 
alienation or condescension), have adopted the strategy of the appearance of passivity under 
the importunities of a media complex which has hypertrophied in an age of 'information,' 
transforming itself from communication to the hyper-reality of the simulacrum. The territory 
is the map, which has no other reference; the feigned is. Just as strategies of becoming, such 
as vigorous intellection and the actualization of self, and the whole project of philosophy, 
resist the demand that we be objects, and thus are a response to oppression and repression, 
so do strategies of being-object resist (in the middle voice) the demand for speech, for the 
maximization of production of meaning and participation in an increasingly rapidly chang-
ing social milieu of which the media are at once sign and simulacrum. The deceit practiced 
by the couch potato is its revenge. It is a vegetable fry strategy." John Rahn, "Repetition," 
Contemporary Music Review 7 (1993): 49-58. 
19 Mary Kawena Pukui, Samuel H. Elbert, and Esther T. Mookini, The Pocket Hawaiian 
Dictionary (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1975), "Grammar," 253. Imagine a Platonic 
metaphysics in a language where "Beauty is good" is rendered "Maika'i ka nani," a noun, an 
article, and a noun, without any copula. See Samuel H. Elbert, Spoken Hawaiian (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1970), 34. 
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calculus (in which there are only predicates and variables). Or the idea of 
the subject may be repugnant because it is captive to what I have called 
the tradition of "optical separation" from Plato to Hegel to Lacan, a sepa-
ration bound up with the theory of the sign and signification in language 
in a way that mayor may not be otiose, but to which music is an alterna-
tive. 20 Dissent and autonomy depend on none of these constructions. 
Theorists such as Deleuze and Guattari, Kristeva, and Butler are all 
dissenters. As theorists, they are artists, "putting forth their autonomy in 
an object designed to engage others," as I put it above. The work of such 
contemporary artists in the literature called critical theory, or simply 
"theory," is exciting and promising partly because, like Marxism and Freud-
ianism, the most effective of the philosophies originating in the nine-
teenth century, this new work combines theory with praxis. "Theory," es-
pecially that which engages the intimate politics of gender, is an intellec-
tual pursuit that involves a way of living one's life. Like religion, and like 
art, it brings each everyday action and thought into a grand arena in 
which very complex and subtle structures contend for the quotidian. 
Art is part of life. Dissent in art is dissent in life. The autonomy of a 
composer is also autonomy within music. A composer cannot choose to 
affirm the musical Center while remaining an artist. The Center in art is 
its death. The Center is not tradition, any more than the Center is History 
in society in general. One may choose to affirm tradition, even in a reac-
tionary way, like George Rochberg; this can still be an artistic choice, a 
perilous act of dissent, based in apartness and autonomy. Every minutest 
compositional choice that is a choice requires that cool and merciless 
apartness. The composer who falls too closely and precipitously in love 
with her work in progress falls prey to sentimentality, convention, automa-
tism-anything but art-and the work dies. The composer's engagement 
with the work in progress makes it the world of the composer, that grand 
arena in which very complex and subtle structures contend from moment 
to moment. Most intimately, it is from this world of the artwork that the 
composer must dissent while participating in its creation. Assuming for 
the moment a Lacanian view of the Symbolic, the artist (of any sex) is the 
father of the work, stepping into an intellectual hyperconsciousness for its 
creation. Reciprocally, the work is the mother of the artist, a daughter (of 
any sex) who must wean herself at every continuous suckle, absorbing and 
being absorbed, but finding autonomy even within total sensuous and 
sensual involvement. 
20 Rahn, "Differences," 63. 
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Composing music is a way ofliving one's life. That very intimate apartness 
from the work while creating the work, the dissent that makes it art, is 
itself the engagement of the work (and of the artist) with the world. The 
music is an object available to others in all its Sichselbstgleichheit, because 
apartness is built into it. 
Without this engagement between the work and the world, there is no 
possibility of dissent, of autonomy of the artist within the world, because 
such dissent is not indifference. It is a difference that requires participa-
tion. And for all of us, only such participatory dissent and engaged au-
tonomy between the artist and the world make possible acts of art that 
move us towards the Center, or away-that, like Circe, bind us ever more 
closely to compliance, or that accompany our Penelopean autonomy. 
ABSTRACT 
To explore the question "How can someone create art now?," the essay 
first sketches a broad historical framework, and continues by peering 
through a lens made of two concepts: the center, and dissent. It explores 
the Greek influence (Plato the centrist, Socrates the dissenter; dissent as 
apartness, the center as control molded by dissent) and Christianity (dis-
sent in Job, the Fall, and St. Francis). Whereas the dissent of Socrates was 
the mold filled by Plato's Center, in Christianity the omnipotent, omni-
present God is the mold, Sin and the Fall its negative, dissent molded by 
the Center: a double obverse. 
The essay talks about contemporary music and violence: the beat and 
the originary scene (Boulez), other strategies (Xenakis, Cage); commo-
dification; rock promoting the ecstasy of identity and submission; Disney-
fication. It explores feminism on violence; critical theory on the subject; 
the Deleuzian Body Without Organs and Kristeva's chora; and Judith But-
ler on subjectless agency, signification as a regulated process of repetition. 
Finally, the essay touches on the relations among dissent, autonomy, agency; 
superfaciality; insignification; theory as praxis as art as life; and intimate 
apartness built into the Sichselbstgleichheit of the work of art. 
